Introduction
Since the unification of the two German states, the system of mandatory pension insurance in Germany, based on a pay-as-you-go scheme since 1957, has been under constant financial pressure. In the year 1997, to balance current pension claims of retirees with current revenue from workers, the contribution to the Public Pension Scheme had increased to 20.3 percent of the payroll, split equally between employees and employers. Afterwards further increasing contribution rates have been avoided only by substantial extra subsidies to the pension system. In fact, the recent increment in federal subsidies, mostly financed through new taxes on the consumption of energy and mineral oil, has been large enough to moderately reduce the payroll contribution to the Public Pension Scheme, to the current rate of 19.1 percent.
In 2000, the government subsidy to balance the pension insurance budget was expected to reach 49.4 billion Euro. This was the largest expenditure item in the government budget, totalling 20.2 percent of all spending. The federal pension subsidy, which is usually justified as a compensation for redistributive elements that contravene against strong tax-benefit linkage characteristic for the German system of state pensions, like credits for child rearing or education and a lift up of low contributions to a minimum level, now covers more than 27 percent of the pension benefits. Translating the fiscal burden related to this pension subsidy into a fictive contribution rate, the actual burden on labour through public pensions would be as high as 25.2 percent of the payroll.
Thus, the Public Pension Scheme is already imposing a high financial burden on contributors and taxpayers. During the first half of the new century, when the German society, in the consequence of permanently low fertility combined with increased longevity, goes through the demographic transition to higher old-age dependency, the financial pressure on government budgets will become even more severe. The long-established fact that the current public pension scheme might be unsustainable with a diminished ratio of contributors to economically inactive transfer recipients, has produced numerous reform proposals aimed at improving the long-term viability of the German Public Pension system, ranging from a tax financed minimum pension to advanced funding schemes.
Nevertheless German governments for a long time have introduced only tentative measures stabilising the pay-as-you-go system. The 1992 Pension Reform Act will raise the mandatory retirement age for all workers to 65 between 2001 and 2005 , and has reduced hitherto strong incentives for early retirement, but the discount in pensions for premature withdrawal from the labour force is still not actuarially fair. The late Kohl administration had planned to cut future pension growth proportional to observed gains in life-expectancy. This moderate reform, however, was suspended after the Schröder cabinet assumed office in 1998. Instead, the above mentioned cut in payroll contributions through increased government grants to the pension system was installed, with the objective to exploit a supposed double dividend from "green taxes" (Schneider, 1997) .
Not until late 2000, the German government did agree on a really substantial reform of the pension system, which, in addition to a whole range of minor amendments, contains two major elements:
• Measures aimed at stabilising the current Public Pension Scheme, by adapting the pension formula to gradually reduce pension growth experienced by both current and future retirees.
• Arrangements for the gradual introduction of non-mandatory, individual pension accounts, dubbed "Riester Pensions" after the government minister in charge, to provide private funded retirement income alongside the state pension insurance.
This article undertakes to give an overview of the current pension reform decisions in Germany, as adopted by parliament in May 2001, and to critically review their implications. The discussion is split into two parts: an analysis of the reform's impact on the long-term viability of the pay-as-you-go based State Pension Scheme; and a critical review of the regulations to build up individual pension accounts, including an illustration of what might be long-term development of the newly introduced private pension plans.
The Reform of State Pensions
The first part of the pension reform takes measures to stabilise the contribution rates to the Public Pension Scheme in the long term when pension finances will come under demographic pressure. The declared ambition of political decision makers is to keep the contributions financing state pensions under a level of around 20 percent of the payroll until 2020, and under a level of around 22 percent beyond 2030. To achieve this goal, future pension expenditure growth is moderated by important changes to the indexation formula that links pensions to the earnings development.
Moderating pension growth
In Germany, since the early days of the pay-as-you-go based scheme, state pensions have been indexed to wage growth rather than price inflation. For many, the consequence that pensioners share in productivity growth is one of the key achievements of the German welfare state. While the original earnings indexation formula had taken into account changes of average gross wage income, this policy was aban- where P t represents the (gross) pension in period t, NE t the level of net earnings per worker in period t, in relation to gross earnings, and NP t the net pension level of period t, relative to the average gross pension per retiree.
Within the framework of earnings indexation, net adjustment of benefits in line with equation (1) appeals when pension finances are under demographic pressure. First, if the contribution rates to the Public Pension Scheme increase as the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries worsens, pension expenditure growth is moderated automatically-ceteris paribus, the net income ratio of the employed falls but the net income ratio of the retirees (who do not contribute to the system) stays unchanged. Secondly, the indexation formula insures pensioners against falling net income in the consequence of population ageing, for example, if the contributions of pensioners to mandatory health insurance are increased. In this case, ceteris paribus, the net pension ratio of the retired is falling, which leads to a compensating increment in benefits.
However, net indexation of pensions might become problematic in face of income tax reform, as scheduled in Germany for the period 2000 to 2005, and falling pension contribution rates, as made possible by the green tax subsidies to the Public Pension Scheme. Both policies raise the net earnings available to workers while leaving the net amount of pensions (currently de facto tax-free) unchanged, and therefore application of the net indexation rule causes unwanted pension growth.
Decision makers answered this unexpected threat by suspending net indexation, and by temporarily adjusting pensions according to consumer price inflation, during the years 2000 and 2001.
After this transitory period, the current pension reform did not return to the net indexation formula. Instead, pensions will develop according to
where GE t represents gross earnings per worker in period t, τ t P is the contribution rate to the Public Pension Scheme in period t, and τ t S stands for the subsidised private savings contribution rate in period t, discussed below. From 2010, the indexation rule (2) is slightly modified, and only 90 percent of gross wages will be taken into account.
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To the casual observer, it might appear that reestablishment of the fullearnings link is disadvantageous in comparison to the net indexation rule, because gross wages grow at a faster rate than net earnings in a period of demographic ageing. However, the enacted indexation formula will indeed moderate pension growth.
First, the adjustment factor now safeguards against feedback effects from the prospective income tax cuts. Further, the new procedure discards the partial insurance of retirees against declining net pensions. Higher contribution rates to mandatory health and long-term care insurance of pensioners are not compensated by concomitant changes of gross pensions. Finally, as is easy to show analytically, the yearly pension growth rate calculated on the base of equation (2) is more elastic with respect to marginal increments in the contribution rate to the Public Pension Scheme, compared with the old adaptation formula. This means that for any given increase in pension contributions, the new regime generates a higher discount in the subsequent pension adjustment. This possibility has attracted much public concern in Germany, although a lower fraction of net income replaced by state pensions by no means implies that disposable income of pensioners does fall in absolute terms. Official projections of the net replacement rate after the reform seem to indicate that the future deteriora-tion of pensioners' net income position relative to workers will be small. Nevertheless, the current pension law includes a rule that forces decision makers to take countermeasures as soon as the net replacement rate falls below a guaranteed level of 67 percent.
Testing the consistency of the state pension reform
In order to judge the soundness of the current regulations for the state pension scheme one has to test whether the two central objectives announced by its reform- Designing the future economic environment, economic growth is set to a constant rate of 1.5 percent p.a. in real terms. Unemployment and labour force participation rates are kept at their current level. Further, the effective retirement age is kept constant except for the impact of the behavioural changes induced by the measures of the 1992 Pension Reform Act making early retirement more costly (Börsch-Supan 1998) . Compared with the long-term economic forecasts used by government authorities, which assume a drastic reduction in unemployment (basically to the natural rate) and rising labour force participation, in particular of females, this is certainly a conservative setting. Still, the following projection does not seem overly pessimistic. First, it is misleading to conclude that a declining population of employable age, the consequence of below-replacement fertility, would necessarily reduce unemployment, as it is assumed by the government projections. This view ignores the role of labour demand for unemployment, as well as the possibility of qualification mismatch.
Secondly, although it is likely that labour force participation will continue to grow in Germany, it is much less likely that this development will be to the benefit of the Public Pension Scheme. Rather on the contrary, the experience of the last decades suggests that the fraction of employment covered by mandatory social insurance will decline further, as there is a strong trend toward non-standard forms of employment. Finally, the mortality scenario seems very optimistic given the observed trend in longevity. The status quo setting is much more cautious than the lat- Despite the slower pace of pension expenditure growth achieved by the current pension adjustment formula, the long-term increase of contribution rates due to demographic aging is large. The maximum contribution rate is reached around 2035, at some 23.3 percent of the payroll. Therefore, although this is about two percentage points less than under the former legal arrangement, and substantially less than it has been predicted up till now by most analysts of German pension finances (Sinn and Thum 1999) , the current reform of pay-as-you-go pensions fails to meet the target contribution rate of 22 percent beyond 2030.
Sensitivity tests indicate that it would require substantial growth of employment, or more precisely of employment covered by the state pension system, in the next two decades, to realise the stabilisation goal during the period of maximum demographic pressure. 5 On the other hand, in a probably more adequate demographic setting based on more substantial mortality decline, contribution rates to the Public Pension Scheme would increase until the middle of the century, and finally exceed 25 percent. given the long-term failure of the reform to hit the stabilisation target for state pensions, this could be an unfortunate development-the apparent stability of pension finances might prohibit further reform in good time.
Beyond 2030, according to the status quo projection, decision makers could avoid contribution rates above the target level only by raising government subventions, or by further reducing the level of state pensions. The latter, however, would be inconsistent with the net replacement rate guarantee given with the current reform. This is evident inspecting Figure 2 , which shows the time path of the net pensions relative to net income as predicted under the new and old regulations.
The modified indexation formula rapidly reduces the quota of net income replacement, as claimed by many opponents of the reform. In the period of maximum demographic pressure, around 2035, the net replacement level is below 63 percent, substantially less than the guarantee quota of 67 percent, whereas under the now abandoned regime, the net replacement level would stay well above the rate calling for political intervention. Under the current reform, the pension level remains close to 67 percent only if one relies on a statistical construct of net labour earnings treating private savings contributions like taxes. In economic terms, however, this is not a sensible conception of net income. As private savings are voluntary, they are one form to consume current income that competes with rather than crowds out consumption. This means, the decision to save does not reduce individual consumption opportunities but only postpones consumption to a later stage of life. Nevertheless government authorities seem to have based their pension guarantee on this dubious income construct. Note that the net replacement level already falls substantially in the first years of the projection. The most significant drop comes in the very first year when pension adjustment according to consumer price inflation lowers the relative net pension level by more than one percentage point. In the following years, the scheduled income tax reform combined with falling contributions to the Public Pension Scheme raises net earnings of workers while at the same time annual pension growth is moderated by the new indexation formula correcting the development of gross earnings for gradually increasing private savings contributions. In the longer term, relative net pension decline is explained by the fact that pensioners are not compensated for rising health and long-term care contributions by the new indexation rule.
Internal rates of return
A useful strategy to summarise the sequences of state pension contributions and benefits on display in Figures 1 and 2 is to calculate the corresponding internal rates of return. This will also allow to illustrate the impacts of the current reform effort on different generations. The internal rate of return is defined as the interest rate that balances the present value of individual contribution to the Public Pension Scheme over the life-cycle and the present value of aggregate pension benefits received in exchange. Put differently, the internal rate of return measures the average return on the investment into pensions through mandatory contributions. It is therefore an indicator for the individual profitability of being a member of the state pension system.
Internal rates of return are mostly computed tracking typical pension biographies, which accounts for heterogeneity within birth cohorts (Schnabel 1998). In the following, an alternative approach is used based on the intertemporal budgeting method for public sector finances known as generational accounting (Auerbach et. al. 1991 (Auerbach et. al. , 1992 . Generational accounts are defined as the present value of payments to the public sector net of transfers received made by representative members of different birth cohorts over their life-cycle. The internal rate of return to individual payments is given by the constant discount factor yielding a zero generational account. 6 In our context of the pay-as-you-go based Public Pension Scheme in isolation, the generational accounting approach to internal rates of return has the advantage that it allows to consider the various feedbacks between the different branches of social insurance. In addition, it makes it comparatively easy to take into consideration that the individual investment into state pensions not only consists of payroll contributions, but also of tax payments financing the government public subsidy. As the exact incidence of the subvention is unknown, it is assumed in the following that the subsidy is financed through a proportional fraction of tax revenue. This implies that also the retired make an -indirect-contribution to pension financing. policymakers. In such a situation, the only remaining option under pay-as-you-go financing would be further increasing government subsidies to the system. However, considered the already high level of grants that reduces the profitability of the Public Pension Scheme indirectly through the federal budget, this does not seem a sustainable policy. If the public subsidy cannot be increased, however, the contribution rate target and the net replacement rate target are inconsistent.
What way out of this quandary? Considered the relative generosity of the state pension system, one might expect that policymakers will eventually tolerate a more substantial cut of public pensions than is currently envisaged, also if this means that the all-important net replacement quota would fall further below the level regarded feasible today. This is possible, as complementary income from the newly introduced private pension accounts, which we now discuss, becomes increasingly available to pensioners.
Introducing Personal Pension Plans to Germany
While the changes in the Public Pension Scheme described so far appear as the latest step in a long series of attempts to make pay-as-you-go pension financing viable in the long term, the second element of the current reform introducing private pension plans is a fundamental change-in fact the conditions for individual pension accounts make a step toward a Anglo-Saxon style approach to funding Social Security. This is a remarkable development considered that there is strong emotional at-tachment in Germany to the long-lasting pay-as-you-go principle. In fact, the reform plan has met a strong critical reaction. It appears to many that the government support of private pension fund provision weakens "solidarity between generations" provided, as it is claimed, by the Bismarckian type of social insurance.
Incentives for voluntary savings
Under the now enacted rules, workers, up to the earnings cap on contributions to the Public Pension Scheme (about € 57,300 at present), would start saving one percent Spouses who do not work are equally qualified for the standard allowance, provided that the partner pays into a separate private savings plan for them. Furthermore, an extra allowance is given for each child, worth 185 € per year at the final stage. Thus the reform includes a strong family element, which could be justified arguing that by the rising of a child an above-the-average contribution is made to the pay-as-you-go pension scheme (Sinn 1997 ).
Complementary savings allowances by the government are given to anyone proving to put the targeted rate of gross income into a private pension plan, irrespective of the income level. (Individuals saving less than the target rate would get only a fraction of the standard allowance.) Nevertheless, effectively the subsidisation of private savings contributions has been limited to individuals with lower income. This is achieved through a specific tax rule: Whenever the tax refund due to private savings contributions is larger than the amount of the direct government payment, the refund is reduced by exactly the amount of the latter. On the other hand, if the direct savings-allowance is larger than the would-be tax refund, no tax rebate is given.
The impact of this policy on the effective subvention of personal pension plans is illustrated in Figure 4 It is important to note that in economic terms, the tax refund is not a substitute for the direct subsidy, unlike what is often suggested by policymakers. The income tax rebate is part of the deferred taxation policy. Cutting it implies that some of the provision for old-age, intended to be taxed later on, is actually made from taxed income. In the earnings range from 11,200 € to 15,300 €, this disadvantage is more than compensated by the direct savings allowance, but the level of effective subvention rapidly declines. For earnings above 15,300 €, the immediate subsidisation of savings becomes in effect zero, because the loss of tax rebate is equal to the direct subsidy payment.
To generalize, 8 for individuals not eligible for a savings subsidy the parallel system of direct government payments and additional tax breaks appears unnecessarily complex. Tax allowances would be sufficient. An equivalent but more straightforward solution to provide the intended subsidy would be first to give full tax refund according to individual savings to all taxpayers, and then to lift up the refund for taxpayers whose tax rebate is smaller than the target level. 10bn Euro each year. In principle, it is possible that this amount would create a higher return if invested alternatively into reducing government debt. To the extent this is the case, however, the subvention policy, from an intertemporal perspective, does not reduce the overall financial liabilities of the public sector. Note that the strategy of debt reduction is not necessarily in conflict with the long-term distributional objective of the subvention policy: To maintain an adequate income in oldage for low-income earners, standard instruments of social welfare could be used to lift up the -soon reduced-state pensions to a guarantee level. This policy could be financed by the lower interest due after paying off government debt.
Whether reducing (government) dissavings is superior to subsidising (personal) savings is in practice a matter of political and economic circumstances. Politically, subventions to individuals have the advantage of putting funds out of reach for decision-makers. A long-term commitment to repay government bonds, in con-trast, is easy to break under financial pressure. In economic terms, a necessary condition for the debt policy to be preferable is that the interest rate on government bonds is larger than the return to private savings. One would expect that this condition does not hold empirically. With free choice of portfolio and perfect capital markets, agents usually realise a higher return on savings than the market rate on government bonds, if at an increased risk.
However, this is by no means guaranteed for the specific investment into personal savings accounts. First, low-income earners benefiting from the subsidy could have imperfect access to capital markets, for example, because of incomplete information or a limited choice of investment alternatives as the amount to invest is small. Secondly, the return to subsidised savings could be substantially lower than normal, as a consequence of the highly selective investment criteria imposed by the current regulations. This remark leads us to the savings vehicles supported by the reform.
Private savings vehicles
To regulate individual provision for old-age, the bill introducing the Riester Pensions, after many alterations in the course of the parliamentary procedure, specifies a long list of features to be satisfied to make voluntary savings contributions eligible for government support. The rules set have some attractive features but some of the criteria appear too restrictive to make the funded pension provision really attractive.
In particular, to qualify for government support, the individual pension funds, which cannot be distributed before the age of 60, will have to
• provide a life-long annuity, or at least a fixed yearly payment of not more than 3.6 percent of the capital, if annuitisation is deferred until the age of 85.
So far, there are no rules regarding whether the pension payments must be indexed, although contracts providing a growing benefit are certainly not prohibited.
• guarantee that the nominal value of the fund at retirement is at least equivalent to the accumulated contributions.
All suppliers of individual pension funds will be controlled by a regulatory agency certifying financial products that at least formally meet the support criteria. Both the obligation to annuitisation and the contribution guarantee impose a cost on the consumer. For example, it is currently illegal to offer annuity contracts for investment companies, who would have to buy this service externally on the insurance market.
Furthermore, the strict requirement of pension annuitisation might be welfare reducing for the consumer as it might prevent an optimal allocation of consumption during old-age-individuals would in general prefer higher payments at the beginning of retirement, and perhaps sometimes a lump-sum disbursement of the full savings amount.
Although the security of savings contributions is promised only in nominal terms, it might be difficult for investment funds to invent products with a moneyback guarantee. It is not settled yet to what extent funds could make use of derivatives to hedge the contribution liability, or if they have to establish sufficient book reserves. Still, the fact that investment-type fund products have to be combined with insurance policies could lead to substantially lower rates of return on the individual savings accounts, as the range of savings vehicles is limited. This cost of consumer protection is difficult to justify, given that retirement income remains adequate for most individuals even if their individual pension plan is a failure, given the still quite generous level of state pensions.
An issue of public critique is that the above support criteria are not compatible with the favourite type of provision for old-age in Germany, which is the purchase of real estate. This is only a consequential decision, considered the difficulties to apply deferred taxation to the returns to housing. Moreover, it is practically impossible to annuitise real estate unless the property is handed over to the insurer after death. 10 A last-minute amendment to the savings regulations has provided some indirect support of housing property, however-if they acquire real estate for their own use, individuals have the right to temporarily withdraw up to 50,000 € from 10 The current law actually includes this as a viable option eligible to government support.
their private savings account, under the condition of returning the loan until the age of 65. This possibility is highly profitable as the loan is obtained free of interest.
While the conditions to be satisfied by private funded pension provision to get government support appear unnecessarily restrictive, still a wide range of institutional arrangements is allowed. As the regulations in principle do not discriminate in favour of one particular provider of personal pension accounts, there would be competition between at least three types of suppliers:
• Insurance companies, having a head start over other providers, as there is a long tradition in Germany of buying life insurance that provides a type capital pension in old-age. It is not by coincidence that the planned supervision of pension funds is designed parallel to the regulatory controls for (life) insurance companies.
• Banks and investment companies offering savings plans combined with insurance elements for old-age, to satisfy the annuity condition.
• Occupational pension schemes, which have been in decline in recent decades but might come into new life as the current pension reform has made provisions to install "proper" pension funds based on defined contributions.
The different parties have started contesting the market for the Riester Pension Plans immediately after the pension reform was passed into law. Although none can offer a product certified for government support so far, gaining the lead when funded pension provision is phased in is essential, because once having selected a savings plan consumers would not easily change to a different scheme.
It is too early to ascertain how the competing suppliers of Riester Pensions will succeed. One might expect, however that schemes within the framework of occupational pension provision will get a particularly good start, for a series of new regulations creates attractive conditions for pension funds. For employers, the option to offer for the first time defined-contribution plans provides the opportunity to replace the prevalent but disadvantageous practice to provide occupational pensions via book-reserve schemes burdening the balance sheets of the sponsoring company.
This transition receives favourable tax treatment-payments or assets transfers made to a pension fund by an employer, in addition of being deductible as operating expense, are treated as tax-free income of the employee. This implies that commitments based on book reserves can be transferred to a pension fund without becoming liable for social-security contributions.
For the employee, the attractiveness of occupational pension plans has been strengthened by shortening the vesting period (to five years), and by granting a legal right to participate in deferred compensation agreements (Entgeltumwandlung). Any voluntary sacrifice of current salary that is put into a pension fund is tax-free, even above the listed savings contribution rate, up to a threshold equal to four percent of the earnings cap on social-security contributions. While employees are free to bargain with their employers on deferred compensation schemes (which are attractive for the latter, keeping part of the salary free from social-security payments), trade unions will seek to exploit these rules by assigning a fraction of the negotiated pay increase to collective pension funds on the industry level.
Making capital-covered retirement provision part of the collective bargaining process could appear attractive to many Germans sceptical of individual pension plans. However, there is a risk: If private schemes are made largely redundant in this way, this would limit the competition among the suppliers of private provision for old-age, and seriously restrict the range of savings vehicles invented to meet the criteria for government support. In any case, the now allowed defined-contribution plans are not equivalent to Anglo-Saxon style pension funds, because they, like any Riester Pension Plan, must offer guaranteed minimum benefits. This obligation either burdens employers who continue to bear risks from offering a company pension scheme, or reduces the investment return, as pension-scheme managers would chose, for example, only a lower quota of shares in their portfolio.
The returns to private savings accounts
Given that the restrictions on savings vehicles included in the current set of rules for the provision of private funded pensions might substantially reduce the return to individual savings contributions, an important question is whether the scheduled savings rate is nonetheless sufficient to compensate current workers for the reduced replacement of net income provided by pay-as-you-go based state pensions.
This question can be answered by a simulation of the long-term development of the private savings accounts. The following projection supposes that all individuals covered by state pensions always make exactly the envisaged saving contributions to the private system and will start withdrawing savings from their pension fund at the retirement age of 65. Regarding annuitisation, it is assumed that the pension scheme is indexed to productivity (or gross wage) growth, set to constant rate of 1.5 percent per annum in real terms. Computing the amount of the funded pension in the year of entry to retirement before taxes, the average life expectancy conditional on age 65 observed in each period is taken into account. 11 Finally, net private pensions are derived by deducting predicted health and long-term care contributions and applying a constant average tax rate of 15 percent, which is necessarily ad hoc because the taxation rules that will be applied to retirement income are still undecided. Are individuals forced to save too much? Considered that the pay-as-you-go based system misses the contribution rate target already under quite moderate economic and demographic developments, the answer to this question is hardly yes.
Rather on the contrary, only the introduced savings rates would leave enough scope to downsize pay-as-you-go based state pensions beyond 2030 when the contribution rate promise becomes unsustainable already under moderate economic and demographic conditions. In this situation private pensions, even if the return to individual savings plans were very low, would provide sufficient income to reduce the state pension level further and keep to the 67 percent objective for overall pensions.
Because savings contributions are voluntary, it is possible that the empirical development of replacement levels will turn out much less favourable. Individuals might chose not to save the full scheduled rate and therefore net income replacement might be smaller than on display in Figure 6 . However, this would not invalidate the previous argument. Individuals who would voluntarily decide against postponing consumption to old-age, as required by the reform, despite knowing that state pension levels will be reduced, appear as currently over-insured by mandatory pay-as-you go pensions.
Conclusion
With the recent pension reform combining a reductions of the state pension scheme with subsidised voluntary savings to build up personal pension funds, German policymakers have agreed on what are certainly the most radical changes of pension financing since the introduction of the pay-as-you-go based Public Pension Scheme in the 1950s. However, as perhaps inevitable for a political innovation of this significance, it is unlikely that the reforms will pass the test of time unchanged. Many of the details are the results of hasty political compromise, which might explain why the measures take many steps in the right direction but are too cautious at closer inspection.
In particular, the policy to downsize the pay-as-you-go pension scheme is not far-reaching enough. Already under moderate economic and demographic developments, contribution rates to the mandatory pension scheme are still surging when demographic pressure becomes severe. A commitment to further reducing state pension levels beyond 2030 would be a more adequate policy. The early proclamation of realistic state pension objectives also creates additional incentives for voluntary savings, which would recover most of the enforced loss of state pensions even if returns are small. While the scale of the Riester Pensions seems sufficient, the private pension funds on the whole are over-regulated. This concerns both the complex subsidisation of low-income earners through parallel direct payments and tax advantages and the qualification criteria for government support, which could protect consumers too much at the cost of reduced rates of return.
Beside that, there are other unresolved problems. The issue of how to install the deferred taxation scheme has been postponed, certainly as taxing pensioners is not a vote winning strategy. Moreover, the transition to a partially funded system involves difficult issues of intergenerational redistribution. While the internal rates of return of the pension system, including annuities, are given a boost by the reform, they still vary substantially across generations. Distribution policy might have to address two groups in particular: pensioners retiring during the next decade, who are burdened by the substantial reduction of pension levels in the early years of the reform but will not have the time to accumulate compensating savings; and cohorts born in the next decade who will face the peak of pay-as-you-go contribution rates in the period when they are most productive.
But already passing the current reform into law required years of considerable political energy. Anything more, alas, will have to wait. 
